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ABSTRACT 
The electricity market has experienced a major worldwide deregulation process over the last             
40 years. In the deregulated electricity markets the involved parties — the buyers and the               
producers — negotiate electricity deliveries through bilateral contracts or in the spot market.             
This deregulation made the energy sector more competitive and efficient but at the same time               
subject to the risks of the spot prices volatility. The contract parties engage in optimal               
trading strategies in such a way to obtain the highest possible profits. 
Many studies of the energy sector propose a game theory approach to tackle this conflict.               
This work applies the Nash bargaining solution to investigate the optimization problem for             
contract scheduling. A procedure to find all Nash equilibria is developed by generating             
“holes” added as linear constraints to the feasibility region. The mathematical model is             
applied in the MATLAB software. 
Other studies present the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorondinski (RKS) approach as an alternative to           
Nash bargaining to find a compromise solution. After obtaining the set of all Nash solutions,               
a comparison was made between the number of solutions found in both equilibria approaches.              
It is shown that the amount of solutions with the Nash equilibrium approach is the same as                 
with the RKS approach. 
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RESUMO 
O mercado de eletricidade passou por um grande processo de desregulamentação mundial nos             
últimos 40 anos. No mercado de eletricidade desregulamentado, as partes envolvidas - os             
compradores e os produtores - negociam as entregas de eletricidade por meio de contratos              
bilaterais ou no mercado spot. Essa desregulamentação tornou o setor energético mais            
competitivo e eficiente, mas, ao mesmo tempo, sujeito aos riscos da volatilidade dos preços              
spot. As partes contratuais envolvem-se em estratégias de negociação ótimas de forma a obter              
os maiores lucros possíveis. 
Muitos estudos do setor energético propõem uma abordagem da teoria dos jogos para             
enfrentar esse conflito. Este trabalho aplica a solução de Nash para investigar o problema de               
otimização da negociação de contratos. Um procedimento para encontrar todos os equilíbrios            
de Nash é aplicado gerando “buracos” adicionados como restrições lineares à região viável. O              
modelo matemático é aplicado no software MATLAB. 
Outros estudos apresentam a abordagem Raiffa-Kalai-Smorondinski (RKS) como uma         
alternativa à negociação de Nash para encontrar uma solução compromissada. Depois de            
obter o conjunto de todas as soluções da Nash, foi feita uma comparação entre o número de                 
soluções encontradas em ambas as abordagens de equilíbrio. É apresentado que a quantidade             
de soluções com a abordagem de equilíbrio de Nash é a mesma que com a abordagem RKS. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Electricity is one of the leading energy sources, second only to fossil fuels (U.S. ENERGY               
ADMINISTRATION, 2013 cited BARBOSA, 2017). By 2040, world electricity consumption          
is predicted to be 34.5 trillion kWh - 57% higher than in the year 2015 (IEA, 2017). Other                  
studies show even higher expectations - growth of 30% by 2035 - or even a demand growth                 
of 48% by the year 2040 (BRITISH PETROLEUM, 2017; US ENERGY INFORMATION            
ADMINISTRATION, 2016). The main determinants of energy growth can be explained by            
economic growth which strongly influences energy consumption, and also by the emergence            
of electric cars, whose projection of energy demand has grown considerably (IEA, 2017).  
In the late 1980s, the energy market experienced a major deregulation process throughout             
worldwide. This deregulation process which started in the 1980s, aims to open the energy              
market in such a way that it becomes a competitive, efficient, and reliable market with low                
tariffs to end consumers.  
In a deregulated market, energy is traded as a commodity as is iron, oil or natural gas                 
(BARBOSA,2017). Market agents (generators, distributors, retailers, and end consumers)         
have the autonomy to exchange energy with any other agent, establishing the volume, price,              
and terms of supply. In this market, the energy can be negotiated in two ways: a) the "day                  
ahead" market, e.g., spot market, which refers to the transactions carried out in the short term;                
and b) the future market, where the operations are made through bilateral contracts (BC) for               
medium and long term. The bilateral contracts secure delivery of a certain amount of              
electricity at agreed prices (PALAMARCHUK, 2012). On the other hand, the spot market             
trades present highly volatile prices since energy cannot be stored.  
The deregulated market allows actors to engage in optimal trading strategies through bilateral             
contracts or spot market. Electricity received under BC may be resold in the spot market and                
electricity bought in the spot market may be delivered to fulfill bilateral contracts obligations              
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(PALAMARCHUK, 2012). These two markets provide electricity supply to society and           
industry at a fair price, since it reduces losses of inefficiency market. 
Following the deregulation of the world's energy markets, which began in the mid-1980s,             
several studies began to be conducted in order to deepen the knowledge on price prediction               
(ERNI, 2012; WERON, 2014; URYASEV, 2000; BERTSIMAS et al, 2004; POUSINHO et            
al, 2013; GARCIA, 2005). These studies intend to maximize the profits of the involved              
parties in the energy market with techniques of forecasting of price and demand. Different              
methods are used to address the problem, such as the use of game theory, which seeks to                 
obtain a solution which is located at the Nash equilibrium point in the BC negotiation.  
Negotiation techniques pose a major challenge to optimize the agents' revenues given the             
buying and selling decision alternatives. In order to tackle this problem, Cunha (2017),             
Toledo (2017) and Barbosa (2017) present two types of equilibrium solutions for an             
electricity scheduling problem proposed by Palamarchuk (2010). The first approach concerns           
of an optimal contract condition according to the Nash bargain solution. The second proposed              
solution uses the Raiffa-Kalais-Smorodinsky (RKS) equilibrium as an alternative to the Nash            
bargain solution. In this case, the RKS solution resulted in a smaller concession value, that is,                
higher profits compared to the Nash solution. 
Furthermore, several simulations were carried out with different input data and the authors             
were successful in demonstrating the existence of other optimal solutions to the problem             
when applying the RKS approach. The necessity arises to develop an algorithm that finds all               
the set of optimal solutions for this research problem. A mathematical model was formulated              
and found all the solutions with the RKS approach (MONTEIRO, 2018). The present work              
aims to provide a model to find, then, the set of Nash bargain solutions. The algorithm is                 
formulated and is used to find all the Nash bargain solutions. Lastly, it compares the set of                 
solutions found with the RKS equilibrium in the work of Monteiro (2018). It is also important                
to compare the number of solutions that each equilibrium approach provides due to the              
flexibility it gives to the agents. In case that the number of solutions is bigger in one                 
approach, that means that it gives more options for the decision makers in the contract               
scheduling. 
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 1.1 OBJECTIVES 
 
This project aims to identify the set of all optimal Nash equilibrium solutions in a dynamic                
energy bilateral contract scheduling. In order to do so, a mathematical model will be              
developed based on the concepts of operations research and game theory.  
 
1.2 MAIN OBJECTIVE 
 
The main objective of the current project can be explained as: 
"The development of a mathematical model for a dynamic energy bilateral contract            
scheduling with the purpose of identifying the set of all optimal Nash equilibrium solutions to               
maximize the profits for the involved parties." 
 
1.3 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
 
The main objective can be subdivided into four separate specific objectives: 
● Analyze the Nash bargain problem of the energy sector; 
● Investigate the method for obtaining the set of all optimal solutions; 
● Design and implement the mathematical model that provides the set of all optimal             
solutions; 
● Compare the results obtained from the Nash bargain solution with those of the RKS              
solution. 
 
 
1.4 PROJECT STRUCTURE 
 
The structure of this work is organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION, describes the context, motivation, and the objective of            
this project. 
 
Chapter 2 - METHODOLOGY, presents the research strategy used in this project. 
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Chapter 3 - LITERATURE REVIEW, introduces the reader to the field of electricity             
markets, the bilateral contract negotiations, and the Spot market. Furthermore, this chapter            
presents the theoretical background for the development of the mathematical model.  
Chapter 4 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL, presents the problem designed            
by Palamarchuk and a numerical example to illustrate the problem. Subsequently, it is             
proposed a model to find the set of Nash bargaining solutions for the problem presented by                
Palamarchuk. 
Chapter 5 - RESULTS. This chapter provides the results of the set of all Nash               
equilibria obtained with the algorithm applied in the MATLAB software. Later, we present a              
comparison with the results obtained with the Raiffa-Kalais-Smorodinsky approach.  
Chapter 6 - CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDIES. In this chapter, a reflection is             
given on the work done and topics for future work are proposed. 
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 2.METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to classify this work it is necessary to introduce some important concepts of research                
classification. This chapter will describe different research classifications and will present the            
research approach used in the project. 
 
2.1 RESEARCH CLASSIFICATION 
 
Scientific research is a systematic, controlled, and critical reflexive procedure that allows the             
discovery of new facts or data, new relationships or laws, in any field of knowledge               
(ANDER-EGG, 1978). It is then necessary to classify the research according to some criteria.              
Scientific research can be classified according to the research method, objectives, procedures,            
and nature (SILVEIRA; CÓRDOVA, 2009).  
 
From the point of view of the method, the research can be quantitative, qualitative, or a                
mixed approach (CRESWELL, 2010). In the quantitative one, the study focuses on            
objectivity. The quantitative method deals with numbers and anything that is measurable to             
explain, predict, and control a phenomenon (LEEDY, 1993). On the other hand, the             
qualitative method does not require the use of statistic and mathematical tools. In this              
method, the researcher is focused on the aspects that can not be quantified to understand the                
dynamics of social relations (SILVEIRA; CÓRDOVA, 2009). Lastly, the mixed method           
focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single              
study or a series of studies (CRESWELL, 2010). The central premise of the mixed method is                
the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches combined, providing a better understanding            
of the research problems than either approach alone (CRESWELL, 2010). 
 
According to the objectives, scientific research can be classified as exploratory, descriptive,            
or explanatory (GIL, 2008). Exploratory research aims to provide greater familiarity with the             
problem. It involves a bibliographical survey, interviews with people with experience with            
the researched issue, and the analysis of an example that gives a better understanding of the                
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problem (GIL, 2008). The majority of the research done for academic purposes, at least in               
some level, has an exploratory approach (GIL, 2008). The descriptive research requires a             
series of information about what the researcher wants to investigate. This type of study aims               
to describe the facts and phenomena of a certain reality (TRIVIÑOS, 1987). Examples of              
such projects are: case studies and documentary analysis. Explanatory study, on the other             
hand, aims to identify the factors that determine or contribute to occurrence of a phenomena               
(GIL, 2008). Explanatory research may be the continuation of another descriptive one, since             
the identification of the factor that determines a certain phenomenon requires that it be              
sufficiently described and detailed. 
In terms of the procedures, there are seven types of research as follows (GIL, 2008): 
Table 1 - ​Types of research 
Bibliographic This type of research is based on material that is 
already published, and consists mainly of books and 
scientific articles.  
Documentary Similar to the bibliographical one. The difference lies 
in the nature of the sources, since this procedural form 
is made of materials that have not yet received an 
analytical treatment. 
Experimental When a study object is determined, the variables that 
can influence the study are selected and the forms of 
control and the observation of the effects that the 
variable produces on the object are defined. 
Survey It is the direct interrogation of people whose behavior 
the researcher wishes to know about. It is necessary to 
request information from a significant group of people 
about the problem studied and then, through 
quantitative analysis, obtain the conclusions 
corresponding to the collected data. 
Field Study It involves an in-depth and exhaustive study of a 
specific reality. It is performed through the direct 
observation of the activities of the studied group and 
through interviews with sources to capture the 
explanations and interpretations of the field. 
Case Study Consists of an in-depth and exhaustive study of one or 
a few objects, in a way that allows for ample and 
14 
 detailed knowledge to be collected. 
Action Research An empirically based type of research that is conceived 
and carried out in close association with an action or 
with the resolution of a collective problem in which 
researchers and participants of the situation or problem 
are involved in a cooperative or participatory manner. 
 
Finally, according to nature, the research can be classified as basic or applied. Basic research               
aims to generate new knowledge that is useful for advances in science without the practical               
application. Applied research, however, aims to generate knowledge for practical application           
and is targeted to the solution of specific problems.  
 
After evaluating the research definitions, it is possible to conclude that this work follows a               
quantitative approach, has a descriptive objective, is based on bibliographic procedures, and            
is classified as applied research. 
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3.LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1. ELECTRICITY MARKET SYSTEM 
For nearly a century, the electricity market system in all countries has been thought of a                
"natural" monopoly industry (CHAO; HUNTINGTON, 1998). Such a scenario required          
reliance on public or private monopoly subject to the government regulation to achieve             
efficient production. However, over the last decades, the electricity market system has been             
forced to transform the way of operation in many countries. The main argument of the               
deregulation of the market system is the inefficiency of regulation (STOFT, 2002). 
The reasons of changing from vertically integrated mechanisms to open markets have            
differed over regions and countries (ABHYANKAR, KHAPARDE, 2013): In developing          
countries, the main problems have been a high demand growth combined with inefficient             
system management and unreasonable tariff policies. Those problems have affected the           
accessibility of financial resources to improve generation and transmission capacities. For           
developed countries, on the other hand, the motivation has been to provide electricity at lower               
prices and offer them a greater choice in purchasing economic energy. 
A deregulated market promotes an extremely competitive environment. In this model, there is             
certain autonomy regarding the amount of generation and consumption negotiated as well as             
their respective prices: Consumers and suppliers arrange trades independently. Through          
competition in liberalized markets, incentives are created to drive for the more efficient             
operation of electricity systems (IEA, 2005). These include labor saving techniques, more            
efficient repairs, less costly construction on new plants, and wiser investment choices in             
terms of timing, sizing, siting and choice of technology (STOFT, 2002; IEA, 2005).
Contract parties schedule electricity deliveries over a contract period to obtain the highest             
possible profit. One of the methods to achieve the maximum profit is contract portfolio              
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management. This method seeks to obtain the diversification of the agreed contracts (DE             
LLANO-PAZ ET AL, 2017; cited BARBOSA, 2017). Each contract is subject to different             
constraints and associated risks. Thus, the agents of the energy market usually act both on the                
spot market and bilateral contracts (future market). In the next sections, we will describe each               
one of the contracts for energy transactions. To do that, first, a definition of the electricity                
market agents will be provided. 
3.1.1. ACTORS 
The electricity market is composed of the following actors (KIRSCHEN, 2004): 
Table 2 - ​Actors of the electricity market 
ACTORS 
Generating 
Companies 
Produce and sell electric energy. A generating company can own a 
single plant or a portfolio of plants with various technologies. There 
are several technologies for generating energy, the most common 
being coal and peat, natural gas, hydroelectric, nuclear, and oil 
(OECD, 2016). The producers can sell both to the electric market and 
the end consumers. 
Distribution 
Companies 
Own and operate distribution networks. In a fully deregulated 
condition, the sale of electricity to consumers is decoupled from an 
operation, maintenance and development of the distribution network. 
Retailers then compete to perform this energy sale activity. One of 
these retailers may be a subsidiary of the local distribution company. 
Retailers Buy electrical energy on the wholesale market and resell it. They 
resell the energy to consumers that either do not want to be part of the 
wholesale market or are not allowed to participate. The retailers can 
buy electricity throw stock trading, futures trading, or bilateral 
contracts. 
Market 
Operators 
Usually runs the computer systems that matches the bids and offers 
that buyers and sellers of electricity have submitted. It also deals with 
the settlement of the accepted bids and offers. That is it forwards 
payments from buyers to sellers following the delivery of electricity. 
Independent 
System Operator 
Its main responsibility is to maintain the security of the energy 
system. The term independent is due to the necessity to have an 
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impartial agent in a competitive environment. In such manner, the 
system is operated so the system does not favor or penalize any of the 
involved parties ​. 
Transmission 
Companies 
Own transmission assets, for example, lines, cables, transformers, 
and reactive compensation devices. Transmission companies operate 
the equipment following the directions of the independent system 
operator (ISO). They are often subsidiaries of companies that also 
own generating plants. 
Regulator It is the government institution that is responsible to ensure the fair 
and efficient operation of the energy sector. It establishes and 
approves the rules of the energy market. Moreover, it deals with 
investigation of cases of abuse of market power. The regulator also 
sets the prices for products and services which are provided by 
monopolies. 
Small Consumers Buy electricity from a retailer and lease a connection to the power 
system from their proximate distribution company. Their 
participation typically amounts no more than choosing one retailer 
among others when the option is available. 
Large Consumers Usually, have an active role in the energy market because they buy 
their electrical energy directly through the market. The biggest of 
those consumers are sometimes directly connected to the 
transmission system. 
In this study, the focus will be on a generation company (GC), namely the supplier of energy,                 
and on an electricity supply company (ESC), the buyer of electricity, that sells it to the end                 
consumers.  
3.1.2. SPOT MARKET 
Typically, electricity markets are divided into spot or future transactions. This distinction is             
based on the time at which transactions are to be completed (BURNS, 1979). Spot markets               
consist of transactions which are completed immediately. It is also called the real-time market              
or the day-ahead market. In the spot market, the seller delivers the goods right away, and the                 
buyer pays for them "on the spot." 
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By the very nature of electricity, it is not possible to store. Consequently, the prices in the                 
spot market are very uncertain. Given that the spot market consists of instant transactions, the               
actors cannot anticipate the cost of contract delivery, accurately (​Jamshidi, 2018). The prices             
in the spot market are established in an auction-based system, where traders hand in prices               
and volumes for production or consumption for given hours the next day ​(BENTH,             
SCHMECK, 2014). Based on these bids, the market regulator generates the demand and             
supply curves. 
This market is commonly used combined with bilateral contracts. For example, generating            
companies (GC) can use it as a source to purchase energy so they can meet a current promise.                  
The reasons to do that can be inadequate production planning, insufficient energy generation,             
or the simple fact that the price in the spot market at a particular period compensates for the                  
decision not to produce a particular amount of energy to be delivered through a bilateral               
contract. 
3.1.3. BILATERAL CONTRACTS 
In this setting, a buyer and a seller agree on a certain amount of energy to be transferred at a                    
fixed price. The contracts can cover periods ranging from weeks until years at a              
pre-established price. Therefore, they provide greater stability in the demand and supply of             
electricity.  
Bilateral contracts are often used to reduce the spot price risks of its uncertainty and               
volatility. High demand, for example, culminates in a large increase in the electricity price.              
Since the spot market prices, due to their uncertainty, may be higher or lower than predicted,                
bilateral contracts are an essential tool to protect and mitigate risks.  
This type of contract is negotiated based on expected long-run price averages. Although the              
contract can be used as a means to avoid risk, the spot bidding may also provide the                 
possibility of higher profits to the actors. High prices in the spot market are favorable for the                 
generation company (GC) to increase sales in this market and reduce deliveries under BC.              
Simultaneously, it is profitable for the electricity supply company (ESC) to decrease purchase             
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from the spot market and increase contract deliveries. Therefore, the involved parties need to              
manage the combination of bilateral contracts and spot market transactions searching for            
profit maximization (Xia et al, 2019).  
3.2.OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
Operations research (OR) is a scientific approach to decisions (KAUFMANN, 1963). The            
term gained significant recognition in World War II. At that time, there was a great need to                 
allocate scarce resources in various military operations to achieve each operation in an             
effective manner (HILLIER, 2004). For this reason, the British and U.S. army invited a group               
of scientists to apply a scientific approach in order to solve strategic and tactical problems               
(HILLIER, 2004). It was used to deploy radars, manage convoys, prioritize bombing            
missions, and control anti-submarine operations (WANG, 2017).  
After World War II, the success of operations research aroused great interest in applying the               
methods outside the military sector. Since then, the business world has been investing heavily              
to put the operations research studies together with the industry's needs. Typical examples of              
OR techniques in the business sector are routing, logistics, investment portfolio definition,            
planning forecasts, scheduling, project analysis, queueing optimization, along with others.          
The operations research description nowadays is commonly accepted as a scientific approach            
for better decisions in a complex and uncertain environment (WAGNER, 1975).  
While the statistical method is a very ancient means of treating information, the analytical              
techniques are recent developments (KAUFMANN, 1963). Operations research requires the          
use of models, which are mathematical representations of the actual systems. An optimization             
model seeks to find values of the decision variables that optimize (maximize or minimize)              
one or more objective functions among a set of all values for the decision variables that                
satisfy the given constraints. 
Even though Operations research is based on quantitative techniques, it does not mean that              
practical OR studies are primarily numerical exercises. The mathematical analysis, in reality,            
is a rather small part of the total effort (HILLIER, 2004). Operations research applies a               
20 
 scientific research methodology that can be summarized in the following phases (HILLIER,            
2004): 
 
 
1. Define the problem of interest and gather relevant data; 
2. Formulate a mathematical model to represent the problem; 
3. Develop a computer-based procedure for deriving solutions to the problem from the            
model; 
4. Test the model and refine it as needed; 
5. Prepare for the ongoing application of the model as prescribed by management; 
6. Implement. 
 
This work has an operations research approach until step 4 - given that the test results of the                  
proposed mathematical model will be presented - so it can later be improved and              
implemented. 
 
 
3.4  GAME THEORY 
 
Game theory is the discipline that provides mathematical techniques for analyzing the            
situations in which two or more individuals (called agents or players) make decisions that              
influence one another's welfare. Each agent's decision is ordered among multiple alternatives            
captured in an objective function for that player. The objective function either tries to              
maximize (in which case the objective functions is a utility function or benefit function) or               
minimize (in which case we refer to the objective function as a cost function or a loss                 
function) (BASAR, 2010). It can be used to study parlor games, political negotiation, and              
economic behavior (VARIAN, 2006). One of the most important concepts of game theory is              
the Nash equilibrium. 
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3.4.1. NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
Nash equilibrium is a fundamental concept in game theory and the most widely used method               
of predicting the outcome of strategic interaction. It was named after the mathematician John              
Forbes Nash Jr., who presented, in 1950, a solution of a non-cooperative game. 
The concept of Nash equilibrium relies heavily on individual rationality (PINDYCK,           
RUBINFELD, 2013). The theory is based on a set of strategies (or actions) such that each                
agent is doing the best it can given the actions of its opponents. Each agent's choice of                 
strategy depends not only on its own rationality but also on that of its opponent (PINDYCK,                
RUBINFELD, 2013). Thus, a Nash equilibrium requires that the agents be right about the              
assumptions of the strategies chosen by the other agent (RESENDE, 2019) 
Stated simply, the Nash equilibrium can be defined as the point of a system that involves                
different agent's interaction in which no agent can improve her payoff with a single move of                
strategy if the other agent's strategy remains the same. 
Mathematically (NARAHARI, 2012): 
Given a strategic form game , the strategy profile isΓ 〈N ,   =   (S )i ,  (u )i 〉  s* = s , , ,( *1 s*2 … s*n)
said to be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of  if,Γ  
, ,  ui s , s( *1  *−i) ≥ ui (s , s )1  −i  ∀s i ∈ Si i , , ,∀ = 1 2 … n
That is, each agent’s Nash equilibrium strategy is the best response to the Nash equilibrium               
strategies of the other players. 
Given a game , the best response correspondence for player ​i ​is the  Γ 〈N ,   =   (S )i ,  (u )i 〉           
mapping  defined by→ 2Bi : S−i
Si
Bi (s )−i = s  ∀s{ i ∈ Si : ui (s , )i s−i ≥ ui s ,( ′i s−i) ′i ∈ Si}
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(1)
(2)
That is, given a profile of strategies of the other players, gives the set of all best     s−i         Bi (s )−i       
response strategies of player ​i ​. 
It can be seen that the strategy profile  is a Nash equilibrium if,s , ,( *1 … s*n)
B      ∀i , , .s*1 ∈  i s( *−i) ,  = 1 … n
Given a strategic form game , a strongly (weakly) dominant strategy     〈N ,  Γ =   (S )i ,  (u )i 〉       
equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium. The intuitive explanation for this is as  s , ,( *1 … s*n)            
follows. In a dominant strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium strategy of each player is a best               
response irrespective of the strategies of the rest of the players. In a pure strategy Nash                
equilibrium, the equilibrium strategy of each player is a best response against the Nash              
equilibrium strategies of the rest of the players. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is a much weaker                
version of a dominant strategy equilibrium. It is also fairly obvious to note that a Nash                
equilibrium need not be a dominant strategy equilibrium. 
Furthermore, Nash's Existence Theorem states that for every game with finitely strategies            
there will be at least one Nash equilibrium. Thus, the concept of Nash equilibrium is not                
problematic. The theorem establishes that the notion of a Nash equilibrium is coherent in a               
deep way (JEHLE, RENY, 2001). For any finite game, it is guaranteed that there will be a                 
Nash equilibrium solution to the strategy problem. 
EXAMPLES OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
Battle of the Sexes (BOS): 
The BOS games can be exemplified with the following payoff matrix: 
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(3)
Table 3 - ​Battle of the sexes payoff 
1 
2 
A B 
A 2,1 0,0 
B 0,0 1,2 
There are two Nash equilibria here, namely (A,A) and (B,B). The profile (A,A) is a Nash                
equilibrium because 
 u1 (M , )M > u1 (F , )M
(M , ) (M , )  u2 M > u2 F
The profile (F,F) is a Nash equilibrium because 
 u1 (F , )F > u1 (M , )F
(F , ) (F , )  u2 F > u2 M
The best response sets are given by: 
B  B1 (M ) = {M} ; B1 (F ) = {F } ;  2 (M ) = {M} ;  B2 (F ) = {F }
Since , is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, since ∈B and M∈B  M 1 (M )  2 (M )   (M , )M        
, is a Nash equilibrium. The profile is not a Nash∈B and F∈B  F 1 (F )  2 (F )   (F , )F        (M , )F     
equilibrium since 
∋B ∋B  M 1 (F ) ; F 2 (M ) ;
Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
We consider the prisoner’s dilemma problem, which has the following payoff matrix: 
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(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Table 4 - ​Prisoner’s dilemma payoff 
1 
2 
NC C 
NC -2, -2 -10, -1
C -1, -10 -5, -5
Note that is the unique Nash equilibrium here. To see why we have to look at the best   (C, )C                 
response sets:  
B  B1 (C) = {C} ; B1 (NC) = {C} ;  2 (C) = {C} ;  B2 (NC) = {C}
Since and for a Nash equilibrium, the only possible Nash Bs*1 ∈  1 s( *2)  Bs*2 ∈  2 s( *1)         
equilibrium here is . This is a strongly dominant strategy equilibrium. (C, )C  
3.4.2. RAIFA-KALAIS-SMORODINSKY EQUILIBRIUM 
Although the results of the Nash equilibrium have been extensively recognized, some authors             
criticized the theory proposed by John Nash. Raiffa and Luce published the book "Game and               
Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey," criticizing the Nash equilibrium. The critic was            
centered on Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom (IIA). The problem with            
the use of this axiom is the distortion that occurs when agents attribute different utilities to                
the ones that are being negotiated (ANBARCI; BOYD III, 2008, cited Barbosa, 2017). 
The RKS approach was used by Monteiro (2018) and we will compare our results when               
obtaining the Nash equilibrium with the one published by Monteiro (2018). 
3.5. MATLAB SOFTWARE 
MATLAB (Matrix Laboratory) is a computer program used to perform engineering and            
scientific calculations. It was initially designed to perform matrix mathematics. However, it            
has grown over the years into a flexible computing system capable of solving, for the most                
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part, any technical problem (CHAPMAN, 2012). MATLAB includes computation,         
visualization, and a programming environment. Furthermore, it provides a very extensive           
library of predefined functions, which makes it significantly easier to solve technical            
problems in MATLAB.  
The literature analyzed shows us that there are several advantages in using the MATLAB              
software (CHAPMAN, 2012):  
● Ease of Use: Programs can be easily written and modified with the built-in integrated             
development environment, and debugged with the MATLAB debugger;
● Platform Independence: MATLAB is supported on many different computer systems,         
providing a considerable measure of platform independence;
● Predefined Functions: Includes an extensive library of predefined functions that offer          
tested and prepackaged solutions to many basic technical tasks;
● Device-Independent Plotting: It has many integral plotting and imaging commands.         
The plots and images can be displayed on any graphical output device supported by a              
computer;
● Graphical User Interface: It allows the programmer to design sophisticated data          
analysis programs that can be operated by relatively inexperienced users;
● MATLAB Compiler: It converts MATLAB programs into ones that can be run on any             
computer without requiring a MATLAB license. It enables the users to distribute their            
programs to anyone who does not have MATLAB installed in their devices.
Due to the benefits mentioned above and its dissemination in engineering disciplines,            
MATLAB was chosen as the programming environment for implementing the problem           
analyzed in this project.  
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4.THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
Bilateral contracts (BC) involves the determination of electricity amount to be delivered to             
the contract partner at each time interval during the contract period (PALAMARCHUK,       t       
2010). The involved parties are a generation company (GC) and an electricity supply             
company (ESC). The first represents the electricity producer, e.g., the supplier, while the             
second represents the electricity buyer that sells electricity to end consumers.  
The contract parties usually have different interests. The supplier prefers to increase the sales              
in the spot market and decrease deliveries under the BC on the event of higher prices in the                  
spot market. While under the same circumstances, the buyer wants to reduce purchase from              
the spot market and increase BC deliveries. 
The development of this work is based on the problem presented by Palamarchuk (2010). The               
scenario, the model, and the numerical example are introduced in this section. Later, the              
model is implemented in the MATLAB software, and the numerical example is used to              
illustrate the methodology.  The market dynamics can be illustrated as follows: 
Figure 1 - ​ Dynamic of the energy market
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4.1 INDEPENDENT CONTRACT SCHEDULING 
There are two types of BCs are considered as follows (PALAMARCHUK, 2010): 
Table 5 - ​Types of bilateral contracts 
Type I The buyer (ESC) determines electricity 
amount to be delivered as stated in the 
contract at each time interval t. In this 
scenario, the supplier (GC) must guarantee 
electricity delivery according to the buyer's 
decision. 
Type II The supplier (GC) establishes the electricity 
amount to be sold under the BC at each time 
interval. Here, the buyer (ESC) accepts the 
delivered electricity in accordance with the 
supplier requirement. 
Let ESC be going to sign a BC of type I. It determines contract deliveries over the contract                  
period. Suppose that the contract period is divided into equally long intervals . The          N    t   
forecasts of electricity prices in the spot market at each time interval are random variables.            t    
When scheduling the BCs the ESC maximises its expected profit :S1  
Where is a mathematical expectation symbol. Since the price  for the considered contractE J  
is constant, profit maximisation is equivalent to maximisation of the expected sales revenue 
in the spot and retail markets the equation can be rewritten as:R1  
Subject to the following constraints 
a) the total contract volume:
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(9)
(10)
b) the sales to end consumers:
c) the delivery amount under the contract at certain intervals:
d) the non-negativity of variables:
Solving the problem, ESC determines the schedule of electricity deliveries for          , t , ..,  xt  = 1 . N  
the contract period and brings it to notice of the GC. In this case, the GC is the second party                    
of the BC. GC agrees to supply electricity according to the schedule, established by ESC.  
Suppose that for each time GC knows its production cost as a function of electricity     t       (x )C t tg      
generation . The function is based on the optimal unit commitment, in a way of obtaining xtg                
minimum costs.  
The main objective of the GC is also to maximise its profit by simultaneous participation            S2    
in the spot market and the BCs market: 
Since is constant, the expression can be replaced byJ  
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(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
Subject to the following constraints 
a) the electricity generation at each interval:
b) the delivery amount under the contract at individual intervals:
c) the non-negativity of variables:
4.2 COMPROMISE APPROACH TO CONTRACT SCHEDULING 
The two types of contracts presented in the previous section illustrate possible ways to deal               
with the negotiation. In both types of contract, one party has the privilege to schedule               
delivery while the other party plays the role of a subordinate partner. Consequently, the party               
who has the privilege of decision has also the greater opportunity of a higher profit. In this                 
context, the parties seem to be in different conditions (PALAMARCHUK, 2010). However,            
there is a different approach in which both BC parties are seen as equal partners. 
The compromise approach to contract scheduling presents another way to balance the interest             
of the BC parties. This approach is structured in a way that both parties agree to make an                  
equal and minimum concession of the maximum profit, which could be obtained from their              
independent programming (BARBOSA, 2017). In general, this approach seeks an agreement           
whose contract value and electricity delivery make it profitable for both parties. 
The equation that determines the maximum profit for both parties can be represented by              
(PALAMARCHUK, 2010): 
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(18)
(19)
Denote by the amounts of deliveries corresponding to the  , , , , , , t , ..,  xst0 xt0ss xk
t0 xt0gs xt0gss xct0  = 1 . N        
compromise variant of the BC. 
The revenues of ESC with compromise deliveries are: 
and the revenues of GC with compromise deliveries are: 
Relative concessions of the ESC are 
Relative concessions of the GC are 
The Nash point from the Pareto-optimal set provides players with the maximum possible             
profits, at their relative concessions being equal. Denote and the profits of ESC and        S01   S
0
2       
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(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
GC at the Nash point. The necessary condition for obtaining the Nash point is max ( )               x SS01 
0
2  
on the set of possible profits. 
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium point is the midpoint between the revenues of ESC and GC. 
Denote and , the relative concessions can be rewritten as:/2S01 = S*1 /2S
0
2 = S*2  
An important aim for the compromise contract scheduling is to obtain electricity deliveries by 
time intervals t. The following problem can be solved for this purpose, where representsk   
the concession: 
subject to 
a) the equality of relative profit decreases (relative concessions)
and 
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(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
b) the consideration of points from the set of mutual profits
c) the total contract volume
d) the sales to end consumers
e) the electricity generation at each interval
f) the non-negativity of variables
4.3. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
In order to obtain the set of all optimal Nash equilibrium solutions the same input data used                 
by Palamarchuk (2010) were used. Table 6 and Table 7 present randomly assigned values of               
the energy price on the spot market, as well as their probabilities For the analyzed problem,                
Palamarchuk (2010) considered 3 time intervals. The total volume considered was V=145. 
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(35)
Table 6 - ​Initial data for BC scheduling made by ESC 
Table 7 - ​Initial data for BC scheduling made by GC 
4.4 THE MODEL 
Previous studies suggest the existence of more than one Nash equilibrium for the energy              
bilateral contracts problem (TOLEDO, 2017; CUNHA, 2017). In those studies, simulations           
were made with different contract values and the same input data. The results allowed the               
authors to conclude that there is more than one optimal solution for the current problem.  
However, the previous studies did not involve an in-depth search to determine the set of               
optimal solutions. After an extensive literature study, the work of Pozo and Contreras (2011)              
was selected because it proposes a new methodology to find all Nash equilibria.  
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4.4.1 METHOD TO FIND MULTIPLE NASH EQUILIBRIA BY POZO AND          
CONTRERAS (2011) 
Normally, there is more than one pure Nash equilibrium (POZO; CONTRERAS, 2011). The             
proposed model consists of creating "holes" in the feasible region in order to find these               
equilibria. The holes are centered around each Nash equilibrium found. For each newly             
equilibrium, a new linear constraint (hole) is added in the feasible region, as shown in the                
equation XX 
(x )² y )² ≥ r²∑
k,t,i,b
e
ktib − x*ktib + (
e
ktib − y*ktib
The radius r must be small enough so as not to lose any solutions inside the hypersphere hole,                  
and the solution must not belong to the boundary of the hypersphere hole (POZO;              
CONTRERAS, 2011)  
This work studies an optimization problem presented by Palamarchuk (2010) with six            
variables ( for three different time periods . Hence, the , , , x , )  xk xs xss xc gss xgs      1, , )  t = ( 2 3    
equivalent equation to be applied to the problem is 
)² )² )² )² (x )² )² ≥ r²∑
3
1
(xk
e t − xk
 t* + (xs
e t − xs
 t* + (xss
e t − xss
 t* + (xc
e t − xc
 t* +  gs
e t − xgs
 t* + (xe tgss − x
 t*
gss
The mathematical problem was implemented in the MATLAB software, and the results are             
shown in the next chapter. The program used in this work is presented in the Appendix.  
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5.RESULTS
As stated before, the same numerical example proposed by Palamarchuk (2010) was            
replicated in the model. That makes it possible to validate the model according to its results.                
The input data for the algorithm are presented in tables 6 and 7. The code of the MATLAB                  
algorithm is described in Appendix A. The standard test was conducted with total volume              
V=145.  
After running the program (Appendix A) to find all Nash equilibria with the new constraint               
proposed by Pozo and Contreras (2011), the solutions were obtained as shown in table 8. 
The first solution is analogous with the one given by Palamarchuk (2010) for the Nash               
bargain solution. Eight sets of solutions were found according to the conditions of V=145.              
From the ninth iteration onwards, the value of the objective function was worse than the               
previous one. That implies that the feasible region went through exhaustion of optimal points,              
due to the appearance of the holes. The relative concession was ​56,08% ​as presented in the                
solution in Palamarchuk (2010).  
We can confirm that the solutions presented in table 8 meet the constraints listed above. As                
for example, in Solution 1 where or      2, 5 , 5 , 8 0, 4 0, 5 4, 3) 45  ( 2 + 7 5 + 9 3 + 3 4 + 6 4 + 3 9 = 1  
, which satisfy equation XX. Following the samex ) 45  ( 1k + x
2
k + x
3
k + x
1
ss + x2ss + x3ss = 1         
argument, the solution numbers can be confirmed for the other constraints. 
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 Table 8 ​ - Nash optimal solutions for contract value V=145 
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 To compare the Nash equilibrium with the RKS equilibrium in this scenario, the same model               
was implemented by Monteiro (2018). The set of RKS solutions for V=145 is presented in               
Table 9. 
Table 9​ - RKS optimal solutions for contract value V=145 
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 In all the sets of solutions, the best alternative for both parties was the one with the                 
Raiffa-Kalais-Smorodinsky equilibrium, compared with the Nash equilibrium one. The         
relative concession was ​55,01%​, e.g., the best alternative for the proposed problem.  
 
The model for the set Nash solutions was run for different inputs of different contract values.                
The results are presented in Appendix B.  
 
It is observed that there is a variability on the number of solutions depending on contract                
volumes. Monteiro (2018) raised an interesting question in his suggestion of future studies:             
"Which (equilibrium), after all, would have the largest number of solutions and how different              
would these solutions be?" Table 10 summarizes the number of total solutions for the contract               
values V=135, V=140, and V=145. 
 
Table 10 - ​Comparison between the amount of solutions 
 
 
After running the model for both equilibria, it was interesting to note that the number of                
optimal solutions for both the Nash equilibrium and the RKS equilibrium is the same. This               
implies that, even with different hole points, the method of finding the set of all optimal                
solutions operates in a similar way. 
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 6.CONCLUSION 
 
We have discussed the importance of contract scheduling within the energy market. The             
problem proposed by Palamarchuk, restricted to only one optimal solution was expanded by             
Cunha (2017) and Toledo (2017) who were able to demonstrate the existence of more than               
one optimal solution, under the same data and constraints. 
 
As proposed in the introduction, the specific objectives were satisfied. The mathematical            
problem was developed, and we found the set of all Nash optimal solutions to the problem.                
Running the model for different types of contracts (V=135, V=140, and V=145), we could              
compare the results to the ones founded by Barbosa (2018) with the RKS equilibrium              
approach. Thereby, we concluded that the Nash approach provides less optimal solutions            
compared to the RKS.  
 
Another information we wanted to analyze was the number of solutions for the Nash              
equilibrium. In this way, it was possible to analyze the flexibility that each equilibrium              
approach gives to the decision makers. If a higher number of possible solutions were              
discovered for the Nash approach, this would mean that the agents would have greater              
flexibility to contract negotiation. However, that was not the case. The same number of              
optimal solutions was found in both equilibria. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium solution            
is dominated by the RKS equilibrium solution in the analyzed case study both on profit and                
flexibility.  
 
There was no vast difference in the concession percentage between the two studied equilibria.              
However, in the case of a billion dollar market, a slight change in the negotiation can                
represent a significant increase in the revenue of the involved actors. Our research contributes              
to the decision makers of the energy market system to make good decisions regarding              
contract planning.  
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Further research can improve the current project, and help the decision makers to have better               
choices of contract scheduling. A limitation of the current study is that the simulations              
consider only two actors: the generating company (GC) and the electricity supply company             
(ESC). Further investigation can be made taking into account multiple actors such as more              
GCs and ESC, or even other actors of the electricity market: Small and large consumers.  
Another issue to be analyzed is to add risk to the spot price probabilities. The current study                 
uses the numerical example of Palamarchuk (2010), which considers a given probability for             
the spot prices. As explained before, the spot prices are very volatile and thus represent the                
major uncertainty for the involved parties. This possibility can be added to the current              
problem so that the risk due to the uncertainty can be minimized. 
Finally, an additional study could analyze the tendency of change in the number of the set of                 
solutions by varying the contract value. As is was seen in this work, by varying the contract                 
value a certain number of solutions is obtained. However, this number was the same is both                
types of equilibria. 
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APPENDIX A - ​Code for obtaining all optimal nash
solutions 
Compromiseobjective 
function​ k = compromiseobjective(x) 
%This algorithm is based on the paper "Dynamic programming approach to the 
%bilateral contract scheduling" by Palamarchuk in Feb 2009% 
% 
% GC - Generation Company 
% Electricity Supply Company 
%********** F U N C T I O N ************% 
% Function objective - Min k 
%Global Variables Declaration 
global​ ptd; 
global​ mean_spotESC; 
global​ mean_spotGC; 
global​ expectedrevenueESC; 
global​ expectedrevenueGC; 
% Revenue and profit obtained by ESC with independent scheduling 
rESC = 2046.30; 
sESC = 248.50; 
% Revenue and profit obtained by GC with independent scheduling 
rGC = 1797.80; 
sGC = 248.50; 
% electricity price for end consumers, $/MWh 
ptd = [16; 16; 16]; 
% Spot price forecasts made by ESC 
% spot price scenarios, $/MWh 
ptsjESC = [10.0 10.4 10.8; 11.0 11.2 11.8; 11.0 11.4 11.8]; 
% expected probabilities 
csitjESC = [0.1 0.8 0.1; 0.3 0.5 0.2; 0.2 0.4 0.4]; 
mean_spotESC = sum(ptsjESC.*csitjESC,2); 
% Spot price forecasts made by GC 
% spot price scenarios, $/MWh 
ptsjGC = [10.8 11.2 11.6; 11.0 11.6 12.0; 11.0 11.8 12.4]; 
csitjGC = [0.2 0.6 0.2; 0.25 0.5 0.25; 0.1 0.6 0.3]; 
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 mean_spotGC = sum(ptsjGC.*csitjGC,2); 
  
% Contract price in the compromise approach 
J = (rESC + rGC)/2; 
  
expectedrevenueESC = ptd(1)*(x(1)+x(4))-mean_spotESC(1,1)*x(4)+mean_spotESC(1,1)*x(7)​...​ %t1 
     +ptd(2)*(x(2)+x(5))-mean_spotESC(2,1)*x(5)+mean_spotESC(2,1)*x(8)​...​. %t2 
    +ptd(3)*(x(3)+x(6))-mean_spotESC(3,1)*x(6)+mean_spotESC(3,1)*x(9);​...​ %t3 
  
expectedrevenueGC = -(mean_spotGC(1,1)*x(13) - mean_spotGC(1,1)*x(16) - (8.4       
+1.4*(x(10)+x(13))+0.4*((x(10)+x(13))^2)) ​...​ %t1 
+ mean_spotGC(2,1)*x(14) - mean_spotGC(2,1)*x(17) - (10.4 +1.52*(x(11)+x(14))+0.44*((x(11)+x(14))^2))        
...​ %t2 
+ mean_spotGC(3,1)*x(15) - mean_spotGC(3,1)*x(18) - (11.2 +        
1.4*(x(12)+x(15))+0.32*((x(12)+x(15))^2))); 
  
k = (((sESC - ​...​ %S1* 
    (expectedrevenueESC)​...  
    +J)/sESC)​...​ %J contract value 
    + (sGC + ​...​ %S2*  
    + expectedrevenueGC​... 
    - J)/sGC)/2 
 
 
Nonlconpaper 
 
function​ [c, ceq] = nonlconpaper(x) 
  
  
%Global Variables Declaration 
  
global​ ptd; 
global​ mean_spotESC; 
global​ mean_spotGC; 
global​ expectedrevenueESC; 
global​ expectedrevenueGC; 
global​ i; 
global​ sym_matrix; 
global​ x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18; 
  
  
% Spot price forecasts made by ESC 
% spot price scenarios, $/MWh 
ptsjESC = [10.0 10.4 10.8; 11.0 11.2 11.8; 11.0 11.4 11.8]; 
% expected probabilities 
csitjESC = [0.1 0.8 0.1; 0.3 0.5 0.2; 0.2 0.4 0.4]; 
  
mean_spotESC = sum(ptsjESC.*csitjESC,2); 
  
% Spot price forecasts made by GC 
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 % spot price scenarios, $/MWh 
ptsjGC = [10.8 11.2 11.6; 11.0 11.6 12.0; 11.0 11.8 12.4]; 
csitjGC = [0.2 0.6 0.2; 0.25 0.5 0.25; 0.1 0.6 0.3]; 
mean_spotGC = sum(ptsjGC.*csitjGC,2); 
  
% electricity consumption by end consumers, MWh 
xtd = [9.8; 11.4; 14.5]; 
  
% electricity generation limits, MWh 
xtgminmax = [14 50; 15 60; 16 65]; 
  
% limits on electricity deliveries under BC, MWh 
xtminmax = [8 60; 5 68; 6 62]; 
  
% electricity price for end consumers, $/MWh 
ptd = [16; 16; 16]; 
  
expectedrevenueESC = ptd(1)*(x(1)+x(4))-mean_spotESC(1,1)*x(4)+mean_spotESC(1,1)*x(7)​...​ %t1 
     +ptd(2)*(x(2)+x(5))-mean_spotESC(2,1)*x(5)+mean_spotESC(2,1)*x(8)​...​. %t2 
    +ptd(3)*(x(3)+x(6))-mean_spotESC(3,1)*x(6)+mean_spotESC(3,1)*x(9);​...​ %t3 
  
expectedrevenueGC = -(mean_spotGC(1,1)*x(13) - mean_spotGC(1,1)*x(16) - (8.4       
+1.4*(x(10)+x(13))+0.4*((x(10)+x(13))^2)) ​...​ %t1 
+ mean_spotGC(2,1)*x(14) - mean_spotGC(2,1)*x(17) - (10.4 +1.52*(x(11)+x(14))+0.44*((x(11)+x(14))^2))        
...​ %t2 
+ mean_spotGC(3,1)*x(15) - mean_spotGC(3,1)*x(18) - (11.2 +        
1.4*(x(12)+x(15))+0.32*((x(12)+x(15))^2))); 
  
c(1)= -expectedrevenueESC + expectedrevenueGC; ​%constraint (31) 
  
% Revenue and profit obtained by ESC with independent scheduling 
rESC = 2046.30; 
sESC = 248.50; 
  
% Revenue and profit obtained by GC with independent scheduling 
rGC = 1797.80; 
sGC = 248.50; 
  
% Contract price in the compromise approach 
J = (rESC + rGC)/2; 
  
ceq = -expectedrevenueESC/sESC - expectedrevenueGC/sGC + 2*J/sESC; 
  
 
if​ i>=2 
  
 
subs_calculation = double(subs(sym_matrix, {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5,        
x6,x7,x8,x9,x10,x11,x12,x13,x14,x15,x16,x17,x18}, 
{x(1),x(2),x(3),x(4),x(5),x(6),x(7),x(8),x(9),x(10),x(11),x(12),x(13),x(14),x(15),x(16),x(17),x(18)})); 
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z=size(c(1)); 
s=size(subs_calculation); 
d = [c(1);zeros(z(1)-s(1),1)]; 
c = vertcat(d, subs_calculation); 
  
end 
  
end 
  
 
Compromiseapproachpaper 
 
clc; 
clear ​all​; 
 
%Global Variables Declaration 
 
global ​ptd​; 
global ​mean_spotESC​; 
global ​mean_spotGC​; 
global ​expectedrevenueESC​; 
global ​expectedrevenueGC​; 
global ​i​; 
global ​testei​; 
global ​r​; 
global ​sym_matrix​; 
global ​x1​ ​x2​ ​x3​ ​x4​ ​x5​ ​x6​ ​x7​ ​x8​ ​x9​ ​x10​ ​x11​ ​x12​ ​x13​ ​x14​ ​x15​ ​x16​ ​x17​ ​x18​; 
 
%amount of electricity delivered under BC (V) 
V=170; 
maxProfitESC = 283.1; ​% According to independent scheduling made by ESC; 
maxProfitGC = 266.1; ​% According to independent scheduling made by GC 
 
%electricity price for end consumers, $/MWh (ptd)  
ptd​ = [16;16;16]; 
 
%spot price scenarios 
ptsjESC = [10.0 10.4 10.8; 11.0 11.2 11.8; 11.0 11.4 11.8]; 
 
csitjESC = [0.1 0.8 0.1; 0.3 0.5 0.2; 0.2 0.4 0.4]; 
 
mean_spotESC​ = sum(ptsjESC.*csitjESC,2); 
 
ptsjGC = [10.8 11.2 11.6; 11.0 11.6 12.0; 11.0 11.8 12.4]; 
 
csitjGC = [0.2 0.6 0.2; 0.25 0.5 0.25; 0.1 0.6 0.3]; 
 
mean_spotGC​ = sum(ptsjGC.*csitjGC,2); 
% electricity consumption by end consumers, MWh 
xtd = [9.8; 11.4; 14.5]; 
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% electricity generation limits, MWh 
xtgminmax = [14 50; 15 60; 16 65]; 
 
% limits on electricity deliveries under BC, MWh 
xtminmax = [8 60; 5 68; 6 62]; 
 
x0 = [9.8 11.9 14.5 0 0 0 22.9 56.6 29.8 9.5 15 5.12 4.5 0 11.25 23.2 53 39.18]; ​%original solution 
 
 
A = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0;​... 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0;​... 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0;​...​ %(34) maxgeneration 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0;​... 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0;​... 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0;​...​ %(34) mingeneration 
     1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0; ​... 
     0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;​... 
     0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;​...​ %(36) maxdelivery 
     -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0; ​... 
     0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;​... 
     0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;​...​ %(36) mindelivery 
     -eye(19)]; ​%(37) 
  
 b = [xtgminmax(1,2);​... 
      xtgminmax(2,2);​... 
      xtgminmax(3,2);​... 
      -xtgminmax(1,1);​... 
      -xtgminmax(2,1);​... 
      -xtgminmax(3,1);​... 
      xtminmax(1,2);​... 
      xtminmax(2,2);​... 
      xtminmax(3,2);​... 
      -xtminmax(1,1);​... 
      -xtminmax(2,1);​... 
      -xtminmax(3,1);​... 
      zeros(19,1)]; 
  
  Aeq = [1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;​...​ %(32) 
         1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;​... 
         0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;​... 
         0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;​...​ %(33) 
         1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0;​... 
         0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0;​... 
         0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0]; ​%(35) 
  
  beq = [V; 
         xtd(1); 
         xtd(2); 
         xtd(3); 
         0; 
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          0; 
         0]; 
  
  
      lb = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; 
      ub = [V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V 2000]; 
  
      ​r​ = 1; 
  
      x0 = [9.8 11.4 14.5 0 0 0 22.9 56.6 29.8 9.5 15 5.12 4.5 0 11.25 23.2 53 39.18 1492.5]; 
  
      ​for ​i​=1:9 
 
  
          ​if ​i​<=1 
              fprintf(​'\n***Solving for Min k ***\n\tCalculating, please wait..'​); 
      [x,fval]=fmincon(@compromiseobjective,x0,A,b,Aeq,beq,lb,ub,@nonlconpaper); 
  
      k = fval; 
  
      ​%x = fmincon(@compromiseobjective,x0,A,b,Aeq,beq,lb,ub,@nonlconpaper,[]); 
  
      solutionESC = [x(1) x(4) x(7); x(2) x(5) x(8); x(3) x(6) x(9)] 
      solutionGC = [x(10) x(16) x(13); x(11) x(17) x(14); x(12) x(18) x(15)] 
  
 ​% by using a (slightly) different initial point x0 (i.e [9 11 14 0 0 0 22 56 29 9 15 5 4 0 11 23 53 39]) 
% to minimize our problem, we still find the same value for k = 0.5608. 
% However, by doing this, we get to another optimal solution, what suggests 
% that the compromise scheduling (and not only the independent scheduling)  
% also presents multiple optimal solutions. 
  
 
xmatrix(​i​,:)=x; 
 
clearvars ​x 
 
testei​(1,:) = xmatrix(1,:); 
 
          ​else if ​i​>=2 
  
 syms ​x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 
  
constraint_matrix = sym(-((((​x1​)-​testei​(​i​-1,1))^2+((​x2​)-​testei​(​i​-1,2))^2   
+((​x3​)-​testei​(​i​-1,3))^2+((​x4​)-​testei​(​i​-1,4))^2+ ​... 
             ((​x5​)-​testei​(​i​-1,5))^2+((​x6​)-​testei​(​i​-1,6))^2+((​x7​)-​testei​(​i​-1,7))^2+((​x8​)-​testei​(​i​-1,8))^2+ ​... 
             ((​x9​)-​testei​(​i​-1,9))^2+((​x10​)-​testei​(​i​-1,10))^2+((​x11​)-​testei​(​i​-1,11))^2+((​x12​)-​testei​(​i​-1,12))^2+ ​... 
             ((​x13​)-​testei​(​i​-1,13))^2+((​x14​)-​testei​(​i​-1,14))^2+((​x15​)-​testei​(​i​-1,15))^2+((​x16​)-​testei​(​i​-1,16))^2+ ​... 
             ((​x17​)-​testei​(​i​-1,17))^2+((​x18​)-​testei​(​i​-1,18))^2)) + ​r​^2);  
  
sym_matrix​{​i​-1,1} = (constraint_matrix);  
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 fprintf(​'\n***Solving for Min k*** \n \tCalculating, please wait...'​);  
[x,fval] = fmincon(@compromiseobjective,x0,A,b,Aeq,beq,lb,ub,@nonlconpaper); 
solutionESC = [x(1) x(4) x(7); x(2) x(5) x(8); x(3) x(6) x(9)]; 
solutionGC = [x(10) x(16) x(13); x(11) x(17) x(14); x(12) x(18) x(15)]; 
k = fval; 
xmatrix(​i​,:) = x; 
testei​(​i​,:) = xmatrix(​i​,:); 
 
end 
end 
end 
  
  
      ​expectedrevenueESC​ = ​ptd​(1)*(x(1)+x(4))-​mean_spotESC​(1,1)*x(4)+​mean_spotESC​(1,1)*x(7)​...​ %t1 
    +​ptd​(2)*(x(2)+x(5))-​mean_spotESC​(2,1)*x(5)+​mean_spotESC​(2,1)*x(8)​...​. %t2 
    +​ptd​(3)*(x(3)+x(6))-​mean_spotESC​(3,1)*x(6)+​mean_spotESC​(3,1)*x(9)​...​ %t3 
  
expectedrevenueGC = -(​mean_spotGC​(1,1)*x(13) - ​mean_spotGC​(1,1)*x(16) - (8.4       
+1.4*(x(10)+x(13))+0.4*((x(10)+x(13))^2))​...​ %t1 
+ ​mean_spotGC​(2,1)*x(14) - ​mean_spotGC​(2,1)*x(17) - (10.4 +1.52*(x(11)+x(14))+0.44*((x(11)+x(14))^2))        
...​ %t2 
+ ​mean_spotGC​(3,1)*x(15) - ​mean_spotGC​(3,1)*x(18) - (11.2 +        
1.4*(x(12)+x(15))+0.32*((x(12)+x(15))^2))) 
  
% Revenue and profit obtained by ESC with independent scheduling 
rESC = 2046.30; 
sESC = 248.50; 
 
% Revenue and profit obtained by GC with independent scheduling 
rGC = 1797.80; 
sGC = 248.50; 
 
J=1650.61     ​%CHANGED BY REINALDO - 17 AUGUST 2017 
 
concessionESC = (sESC - ​expectedrevenueESC​ + J)/sESC 
concessionGC = (sGC + ​expectedrevenueGC​ - J)/sGC 
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APPENDIX B - ​Nash optimal solutions 
 
 
 
Table 11​ - Nash optimal solutions for contract value V=135 
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Table 12​ - Nash optimal solutions for contract value V=140 
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APPENDIX C - ​RKS optimal solutions  
 
Table 13​ - RKS optimal solutions for contract value V=135 
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Table 14​ - RKS optimal solutions for contract value V=140 
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